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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Appellants Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence") and Cindy Lawrence ("Ms.
Lawrence") (collectively, the "Lawrences*) were married during the times relevant to this
action but have since divorced. Although Ms. Lawrence has remarried and changed her
name, this brief will refer to her as "Ms. Lawrence" for the sake of convenience.
Appellee is Intermountain, Inc. ("Intermountain").
INTRODUCTION
The gravamen of the Judgment against the Lawrences is Finding of Fact ("Initial
Finding"), ^ 54, that Wayne Wong ("Mr. Wong") fraudulently failed to disclose to
Intermountain he was promised $10,000 in exchange for his signature on the leases.
However, unlike real property mortgages, the lease agreements at issue in this case (the
"Leases") do not prohibit the payment of an inducement to Mr. Wong. Under the facts of
this case and the law, there is nothing unlawful about an inducement offered to Mr.
Wong. Since any such inducement is not unlawful, the finding of conspiracy to defraud
must fail. There were no other unlawful acts upon which the lower court could base a
finding of fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud. Intermountain concedes this, but asks the
court to extrapolate a fraud from lawful activities, which extrapolation is not permitted
under Utah law.
Further, the judgment against the Lawrences for conversion fails because

1

Intermountain, fully aware it was leasing three vehicles to an entity or individuals other
than Mr. Wong, waived its right to claim and is equitably estopped from claiming the
Lawrences did not have the right to possess the vehicles when the leases were signed.
Additionally, the lower court's imposition of punitive damages was in error, let
alone such harsh punitive damages, because the underlying findings were in error. The
Lawrences conduct was not unlawful, let alone did it rise to the level of malice necessary
to award punitive damages. The lower court's inclusion of prejudgment interest in
calculating punitive damages was in error. Accordingly, the lower court's judgment
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
SHOULD BE REVERSED
A. An inducement is not unlawful
A conspiracy to defraud is a "fraud committed by two or more persons who share
intent to defraud another." Debry v. Cascade Entert., 879 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Utah 1994).
In order to prevail on a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud, the plaintiff must prove by
clear and convincing evidence the elements of fraud. See Gildea v. Guardian Title, 970
P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah 1998). Here, the Court found the Lawrences not liable for fraud,
but liable for the conspiracy. See Initial Findings,ffif60-65. A true and correct copy of
the trial court's Initial Findings are attached to the Lawrences' opening Brief as
Addendum "A."
2

The central finding of the Judgment against the Lawrences for conspiracy to
defraud is Initial Finding, % 54, that Mr. Wong fraudulently failed to disclose to
Intermountain he was promised $10,000 in exchange for his signature on the Leases.1
Ms. Lawrence is then found in *[ 60 to have "participated in the $10,000 offered to Mr.
Wong," although in footnote 15, the lower court could not "conclude that Ms. Lawrence
had an affirmative duty to disclose that inducement to Intermountain, or that her failure to
disclose the inducement constituted a misrepresentation by material omission." Then, Mr.
Lawrence is found in f 64 to have participated in the inducement "[b]ecause Mr. and Mrs.
Lawrence were married and cohabitating at the time ...." The stretch in this finding, and
its lack of logic, is obvious. Utmost, these Initial Findings are contrary to the facts2 and
law and must be reversed.
The plain and simple fact is the Leases do not prohibit Mr. Wong from obtaining
the leased vehicles on behalf of a principal. See Trial Exhibits 1, 4 & 7. Unlike real
property mortgages, there is no language in the Bank of America Lease, attached to Trial
Exhibit 23, which prohibits anyone from paying an inducement fee to the lessee. That
1

Intermountain claims on p. 27 the Lawrences "implicitly concede ... Wayne Wong engaged in
fraud ...." Pursuant to Rule 4, UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY, "Lawyers
shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or claim that counsel has not taken or
seek to create such an unjustified inference or otherwise seek to create a 'record' that has not
occurred." Nowhere in their opening Brief do the Lawrences concede, implicitly or explicitly,
this fact. Furthermore, as argued herein, they contest any such fact.
2

Intermountain claims, in pp. 25-26 of its Brief, failure of the duty to marshal the evidence. As
is clear in the argument herein, the Lawrences use the trial court's actualfindingsto show its
conclusions of conspiracy to defraud and conversion are in error.
3

Lease, in ^f 16(f), contains the following integration clause: "This Lease constitutes the
entire Agreement between you and me; there are not other agreements, oral, written or
otherwise."3

Accordingly, Mr. Watkins5 claim in Initial Findings, |

10, that

Intermountain would never have leased the vehicles had it known of the $10,000 payment
to Mr. Wong, upon which the lower court relied in finding fraud, is contrary to the Leases
and should not have served as the basis of any duty to disclose. Mr. Watkins5 subjective
understanding of the Leases was not expressed to cSave.net, Wayne Wong, Paul
Schwenke or any other party at the time the Leases were entered into or subsequently.
His understanding was not part of the contracts. See Richter v. United Cat. Theatres, Inc.,
Ill CaLApp. 2d 126 (1960)("Contracts are the result of what people say, not what they
intend to say.55) Mr. Watkins5 claim and thus Initial Findings, fflf 10 & 55, and all
findings based thereon, fail. Specifically, they fail for the following reasons:
(1) The integration clause should be enforced.
Mr. Watkins, the owner of Intermountain, claimed at trial he would not have
leased the three vehicles to Mr. Wong had he known Mr. Wong was being paid $10,000
as an inducement fee. Initial Findings, f 10, Trial Transcript, Vol. I., p. 34. However, the
Lease, which was simultaneously assigned to Bank of America, contains no provision
barring the payment of an inducement fee nor does it require the disclosure of any
inducement fee. Mr. Watkins subjective understanding of the Lease agreement and his
3

The Isuzu Leases, likewise, contained no language prohibiting an inducement fee.
4

unexpressed intent not to lease if he had known about the $10,000 inducement is contrary
to the Lease and should not be considered part of the contract. The lower court's reliance
on Mr. Watkins' statement was in error because the statement was only his unexpressed
subjective understanding of the contract, not the contract itself. The contract contains a
clear integration clause. Where there is an integration clause, such statements should not
be considered. See Dairies v. Vincent, 190 P3d 1269,1275 (Utah 2008).*
Intermountain, in making its conversion claim discussed below, insists upon
enforcing the Lease term prohibiting anyone but Mr. Wong from possessing the Black
Rodeo, except for occasional and incidental use. Intermountain should not be permitted
to enforce a provision of the Lease which it believes is favorable (unpermitted use) while
choosing to ignore another provision (the integration clause) which is unfavorable.
(2) There can be no material omission without a duty to speak and there is no such
duty in a commercial transaction.
In order to be liable for a fraudulent failure to disclose, there must be a duty to
disclose. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d
1326, 1328-29 (Utah 1990).

Wayne Wong had no duty to disclose the $10,000

inducement to Intermountain. A duty to disclose must arise somewhere other than in Mr.
Watkins' unexpressed thoughts. As set forth above, there was no duty to disclose set
forth in the Leases themselves, even though Bank of America, Isuzu or Intermountain

4

This argument was presented to the Court as found in Trial Trans., Vol IV., pp. 497-498.
5

could have included such a provision. In a commercial transaction, where the parties deal
with each other at arm's-length, there is no duty to disclose similar to that of parties
dealing with each other based upon a fiduciary or some other form of trust relationship.
See, e.g., Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994). The only basis
the trial court found for holding Mr. Wong had a duty to disclose the $10,000 payment
was Mr. Watkins statement he would not leased had he knew about the $10,000 payment.
This, however, is not sufficient upon which to find a duty to disclose, the breach thereof,
and the imputation of the breach to the Lawrences.
B. Even if Wayne Wong's failure to disclose is a fraudulent omission, such omission
cannot be attributed to the Lawrences.
Even if failure to disclose to Intermountain the $10,000 payment was a
misrepresentation on the part of Wayne Wong, giving liability to fraud on his part, the
payment by itself was not barred by any law and there is no evidence the Lawrences knew
of Mr. Wong's failure to disclose. The piece of evidence relied on by the lower court to
reach a finding of fraud by Wayne Wong and participation in that fraud by the Lawrences
is $10,000 payment to Wayne Wong by cSave.net for his signature on the leases.
This finding, however, does not create any nexus, let alone a sufficient nexus, to
find the Lawrences participated in the fraud. The finding does not establish the
Lawrences participated in any misrepresentation to Intermountain or understood the
transaction to be anything other than a run-of-the-mill corporate lease. Indeed, the lower
court found the Lawrences had no duty to disclose the $10,000 inducement to
6

Intermountain. See Initial Findings, n. 15. The finding, reached via a judicial admission,
the Lawrences knew of the $10,000 payment to Mr. Wong does not establish knowledge
of Wayne Wong's failure to disclose the inducement to Intermountain. Even if the
judicial admission is accepted as fact, it still does not suggest the Lawrences knew of, let
alone participated in, any misrepresentation to Intermountain.

In order to find the

Lawrences liable for conspiracy, the trial court would have had to find they participated in
the fraud or acted in concert with Wayne Wong. See Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873,
875 (Utah 1978) ("[Circumstances may be such to impose liability for representation
made by others as where parties jointly participate in fraud. Conspiracy is an example
thereof ...") (emphasis added). The trial court did not find facts sufficient to hold, by
clear and convincing evidence, the Lawrences participated in the fraud.
A principal may compensate an agent to conduct the principal's business
transactions. An agent may sign a contract on behalf of a principal without disclosing the
agency relationship. See AM. JUR. Agency, § 305:
From the very nature of the situation, the third person's rights do not depend upon
his or her knowledge that the agent was acting for someone else, because it is
evident that anyone dealing with an agent for a wholly undisclosed principal
believes that he or she is dealing with the agent only and relies solely upon the
agent individually.
Agents may be compensated for entering into lease agreements on behalf of principals.
See 2A C J.S. Agency, § 220. A vendor or lessor may choose to extend credit to an agent,
rather than the principal, if the vendor so chooses. See, e.g., Dinkier Management Corp.
1

v. Stein, 155 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. App. 1967); Brandes v. Illinois Children's Protestant
Home, Inc., 179 N.E.2d 425 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1962); Wakefield Fortune Inc. v. Brown,
148 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (N.Y. Sup. 1956). Although a party may seek recourse against an
undisclosed principal for breach of contract, Wayne Wong's principals (cSave.net and
Paul Schwenke) were disclosed to Intermountain as set forth herein.
CSave.net paid its agent, Wayne Wong, $10,000 to enter into leases on behalf of
cSave.net.

cSave.net's involvement was disclosed by its initial communication to

Intermountain on cSave.net letterhead (Trial Exhibit #10) and by providing Intermountain
cSave.net's Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement. See Initial Findings, \ 15
and Trial Exhibits 13 & 17. However, even if cSave.net's principal relationship to Wayne
Wong was not disclosed, it was not required to do so.
The law does not prohibit inducements. Here, cSave.net's payment to Wayne
Wong to enter the Leases with Intermountain was not fraudulent in and of itself. The
only misrepresentation found by the trial court pertaining to the Lawrences was Wayne
Wong's alleged failure to disclose he was offered $10,000 by cSave.net to enter into the
transactions. See Initial Findings, ^fl[54, 61 and 65. However, even if Wayne Wong's
failure to disclose can serve as the basis of fraud, knowledge of his failure to disclose
cannot be attributed to the Lawrences. How can the Lawrences be found liable for
Wayne Wong's failure to disclose the $10,000 payment, when the trial court found no
duty to disclose on the part of the Lawrences? How can the Lawrences be found liable
8

for conspiracy to defraud where they made no misrepresentation to Intermountain and
where they made no attempt to conceal from Intermountain that cSave.net was the true
lessee?
The lower court's finding of conspiracy to defraud as against the Lawrences in
Initial Findings,ffl[61 & 64 should be reversed because such findings cannot be sustained
under a clear and convincing evidence standard. See In Re WDW, 224 P.3d 14,19 (Wyo.
2010) ("evidence is 'clear and convincing' if it would persuade a trier of fact that the
truth of the contention is highly probable). Under Utah law, a trial court's determination
under a clear and convincing burden of proof is reviewed for clear error. See hunt v.
Lance, 186 P.3d 978. 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). Here, the lower court clearly erred in
finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy because there was no requirement in the
Leases or anywhere else that Wayne Wong and/or the Lawrences disclose the $10,000
payment to Intermountain.
POINT 1. THERE WERE NO OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS TO SUPPORT A
FINDING OF CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD.
The other findings of fact made by the lower court do not support a finding of
conspiracy to defraud against the Lawrences. Initial Findings, ffi[ 61(a) and 65(a), both
determined West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the Lawrences which "had
been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar arrangement." Exactly what the lower
court meant by a "similar arrangement" is not described. From the language of If 69 of
the Complaint, Trial Exhibit 24, it appears Ms. Lawrence had authorization from a limited
9

liability company to possess a green Durango. There is nothing unlawful about what is
alleged and nothing more set forth in the Complaint to imply unlawfulness. In fact, the
lower court had "no knowledge concerning the outcome of the case ... and makes no
findings regarding that case." Initial Finding, f 40, footnote 9. Accordingly, it is not
known if the repossession was ultimately determined to be improper, if the vehicles were
paid for or, for example, if the dispute centered over other allegations dissimilar to the
instant case. It, therefore, lacks probative value and is not an unlawful act.
Initial Findings y§ 61(c) and 65(c) stated the Lawrences were present at the signing
of the leases and were "generally aware of the financial terms." As set forth below, their
presence is another indicium that Intermountain knew the vehicles, especially the Black
Rodeo, would not be possessed by Mr. Wong. A finding they were "generally aware of
the financial terms," corresponds with Initial Finding Tf 12 that they "both were aware that
the monthly payments on the vehicles were supposed to be approximately $360." It is not
a finding, however, that they were aware of the Lease terms regarding possession,
insurance or similar non-financial terms and there is nothing unlawful about their
presence at the closing.
Initial Findings ffif 61(d) and 65(d) state the Lawrences had no present intent of
making any payments. This is true; as the trial court found in ^f 6, Mr. Schwenke intended
to lease a vehicle for Mr. and Ms. Lawrence as partial payment for legal services rendered
...." There is nothing unlawful about such an arrangement.
10

Concerning Tffl 61(e) and 65(e), see the Lawrences opening Brief, at pp. 29-30.
Even the filing of a frivolous lawsuit is not unlawful As to Tf 65(f), see the discussion
regarding guilt by marriage on p. 26 of the Lawrences' opening Brief.5
The trial court also found Mr. Wong did not insure the vehicles. The issue of
insurance is troubling, not because of anything Lawrences did, but rather because of what
Intermountain failed to do. Accompanying each Lease was a First Security Bank
insurance form, requiring endorsement of "the Policy Standard Loss Payable Clause" and
providing immediate delivery of "written evidence of such coverage ...." "In the event
evidence of such coverage is not received .... First Security [presumably Bank of
America and Isuzu] may, at their option, apply for coverage as required...." See Exhibits
3, 6, and 9. Intermountain5 s dealer agreement with Isuzu, Trial Exhibit 37, mandates on
page 16 that each "vehicle must be covered by liability land physical damage insurance
naming IMAC [Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation] as additional insured and loss
payee." Further, Intermountain on page 18 is "fully responsible for errors ..." Paragraph
1 of the Assignment of the Black Rodeo from Bank of America to Intermountain
specifically "assigns all of its [Bank of America] rights as an insured or loss payee under
a contract of insurance...." Finally, the Isuzu leases contained a provision that Isuzu must

5

Intermountain conceded in its Brief on p. 43 that none of subparagraphs "(a) - (f) [of ff 61 and
65] involve wrongful conduct." Intermountain urges this Court to "reasonably infer wrongful
conduct" where none is actually found. This is contrary to the admonishment of this Court in
Israel Pagan Estate that civil conspiracy may only be found from one or more unlawful, overt
acts. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 745, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
11

be named an insured in the insurance policy. See Trial Exhibits 4 & 7, paragraph 15(a).
Intermountain was negligent in failing to provide, through its Finance and
Insurance Department, insurance coverage of the leased vehicles until the vehicles were
returned or recovered. The Silver Rodeo, having been in an accident, was recovered in
November 2000. See Initial Finding, *| 27. By then, Intermountain had actual notice Mr.
Wong and cSave.net had not insured the vehicles themselves. The Black Rodeo was not
damaged until long after November 2000. See Initial Finding, ]f 29. Had Intermountain
insured the vehicle, as required to do, it would have been made whole for the loss of the
vehicle. A court will not help a party who was damaged through its own negligence. See,
e.g., First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. in Lamed v. Wetzel, 219 P.3d 819, 824 (Kan. App.
2009)("Equity cannot be invoked to relieve one of the consequences of his own
negligence.")(internal citation omitted).
POINT 3. THE LOWER COURT'S DETERMINATION THE LAWRENCES
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF THE BLACK RODEO PRIOR TO
JANUARY 31, 2001 SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Intermountain seeks to enforce the Lease provision limiting possession of the
Black Rodeo to Mr. Wong. 6

However, based upon the facts and applicable law, the

Lawrences were entitled to possession. Intermountain certainly knew Wayne Wong was
not leasing three vehicles for himself.

The day before Mr. Wong appeared at

6

Again, Intermountain accuses the Lawrences of failure to marshal the evidence. The gravamen
of the trial court's determination of conversion is that the Lawrences "possession of the Black
Rodeo was never lawful under the terms of the lease." Initial Findings, Yl 62 & 66. No
12

Intermountain to sign the leases, cSave.net faxed a letter to Intermountain on its
letterhead indicating its interest in leasing three vehicles. See Trial Exhibit #10. The
lower court took note of this fact in footnote 2 of its Initial Findings by stating, "Mr.
Schwenke's initial communication with Intermountain was a facsimile on cSave.net
letterhead, dated March 29, 2000." The lower court also noted in Initial Finding f 6, "Mr.
Schwenke also intended to lease a vehicle for Mr* and Ms. Lawrence's personal use as
partial compensation for legal services rendered by Mr. Lawrence." Mr. Schwenke was a
business client of Mr. Lawrence. Initial Finding, ^ 4. Also, cSave.net's Articles of
Organization and Operating Agreement were provided to Intermountain. See Initial
Findings, Tf 15 and Trial Exhibits 13 & 17. Further, cSave.net's balance sheet, tax
identification number and P&L were provided to Intermountain. See Trial Exhibits 14 &
15. Additionally, cSave.net's loan application to the Larry H. Miller Group was in
Intermountain5s deal jacket. See Trial Exhibit 19.
Finally, the fact Mr. Wong leased three vehicles, instead of just one, served to
signal to Intermountain he wasn't leasing them for just himself, but on behalf of others.
"On or about March 31, 2000, Mr. Schwenke, Wilma, Tania and Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence
each went to Intermountain's offices for the purpose of selecting the three vehicles."
Initial Finding, ^ 11. ^Following Mr. Wong's signing of the leases, each of the original
plaintiffs except Mr. Wong took possession of the vehicles. Mr. Schwenke and Wilma

marshalling, other than reference to the Lease terms, is mandated.
13

took possession of a silver Isuzu Rodeo (the "Silver Rodeo"), Tania took possession of a
green Isuzu Rodeo (the "Green Rodeo"), and Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence took possession of a
black Isuzu Rodeo (the "Black Rodeo")." Initial Findings, % 19. Without doubt,
Intermountain gave possession of all three vehicles to individuals other than Mr. Wong.
Intermountain even accepted a $3,000 personal check from Mr. Lawrence for the down
payment for each of the three vehicles. Initial Finding, | 12. Taking into consideration
all of the facts listed above, it would require a stretch of the imagination to believe
Intermountain did not know it was negotiating a group lease, and not just with Mr. Wong
individually.

It would take an even greater stretch of the imagination to find the

Lawrences were attempting to commit conversion, perpetrating or profiting from a fraud,
or acting in willful and wonton disregard of Intermountain's rights sufficient to support
an award of punitive damages. There is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing
evidence, that the Lawrences viewed the transaction as anything other than a corporate
lease. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1958)(clear and convincing "implies
something more than the usual requirement of a preponderance, or greater weight, of the
evidence ....").
Even though Bank of America, as the subsequent owner of the vehicle and
presumably bona fide purchaser, may have been able to enforce the Lease provision
limiting the use of the vehicle to the named lessee, Intermountain waived its right and is
estopped from enforcing that provision when it knew other parties were driving the
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vehicles and did not object7 See Red Cliffs, LLC v. 11 Hunan, Inc., 219 P.3d 619 (Utah
Ct. App. 2009)(waiver is the relinquishment of a known right). For the elements of
equitable estoppel, please see Bahr v.

Imus, 211 P.3d 987, 989 (Utah Ct. App.

2009)(elements of equitable estoppels are "a ... failure to act [that is] inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action ... taken ... on the basis of the ... failure to act;
and (iii) injury ... would result from allowing [a repudiation of] such ... failure to act."
Intermountain cannot be accorded the status of "bona fide purchaser" because it had full
knowledge Mr. Wong was not driving the vehicles himself See lohnson v. Higley, 989
P.2d 61, 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Here, Intermountain was aware, at the signing of the
leases and the departure of the vehicles from its lots, that individuals other than Mr.
Wong were driving the vehicles. Intermountain thereby waived its right to subsequently
claim the Lawrences had no right to possession. Clearly, the Lawrences had the right to
possession through January 31, 2001. For the same reasons, there was no conversion of
the Silver or Green Rodeos based upon allegedly non-permissive use.
POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING VICTOR LAWRENCE LIABLE
FOR CONVERSION AFTER HE RETURNED IT TO CSAVE.NET
The lower court's finding Victor Lawrence liable for conversion of the Black

7

Intermountain pleaded waiver and estoppel as affirmative defenses. See R735 et seq.

8

This argument was presented to the lower court during closing argument, Trial Transcript Vol.
IV, p. 495 ("Everybody that was there, an all the evidence in the deal jacket suggests that
everybody thought Wayne Wong was going to be the second guy on the deal, the guarantor, the
co-signor...").
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Rodeo after January 31, 2001, when he no longer possessed it, was in error,
intermountain argues Mr. Lawrence's decision to return the vehicle to the owner of
cSave.net, which is Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong, after he learned Intermountain claimed
the right to possess it, constituted a continuing conversion of the automobile.
Intermountain relies on a single case to support its proposition - Queen v. Lynch
Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 914 (Kan. App, 2002). However, Queen v. Lynch Jewelers did
not address the question of whether an individual may be liable for conversion when the
individual does not possess or control the chattel.
Intermountain's claim of conversion rests on the assertion Mr. Lawrence refused to
surrender the chattel to Intermountain and misdelivered it to cSave.net. The Restatement
(Second) Torts § 237, cited by Intermountain in its brief, states a possessor is to return a
chattel when it is demanded by its rightful owner. However, there are exceptions to the
general rule. For example, a possessor does not become a converter by making a refusal
to surrender the chattel to the claimant for the purpose of affording a reasonable
opportunity to inquire into such a right.
Here, the circumstances under which Intermountain demanded an immediate
return of the vehicle were unreasonable. Intermountain attempted a repossession of the
vehicle at Mr. Lawrence's place of business. Mr. Lawrence was unaware, until that day,
that Intermountain claimed the right to possess.

Mr. Lawrence, when he learned

Intermountain was attempting to repossess, confronted Intermountain and requested they
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either discuss with him the situation or leave. Because of the physical confrontation
between Mr. Lawrence and Intermountain's principal, the police were summoned.
Intermountain's assignment from Bank of America was presented to the police officer.
Upon reviewing the assignment, the police resolved the situation by telling Mr. Lawrence
he could take the vehicle with him. See Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 372, lines 7-19. It
was then that Mr. Lawrence returned the vehicle to cSave.net so cSave.net could resolve
its dispute with Intermountain. Intermountain's harsh tactic in seeking repossession was
an unreasonable demand for return of the vehicle and Mr. Lawrence's refusal to return it
was reasonable. To proceed with self-help procedures when confronted with a breach of
the peace is a violation of the self-help remedy under Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-9a-609(2)(b), By even orally protesting the repossession, many

cases hold that a debtor prohibits the creditor's right to possess the collateral. White & R.
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 26-6, p. 110-11 (2d ed 1980).
Further, Mr. Lawrence committed no conversion by delivering the vehicle to
cSave.net, which is comprised of Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong. Although Intermountain
claimed the right to possess the vehicle, its actual legal right to do so was in doubt at that
time.

Intermountain only presented a piece of paper to the police officer indicating

ownership of the vehicle had been reassigned to Intermouritain from the lender. See Trial
Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 372, lines 7-19. In Underwood v. Dillon Companies^ 936 P.2d 612
(Colo. App. Ct. 1997), the lessee of computer equipment refused to return the equipment
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to the lessor upon terms demanded by the lessor.

The lessor sued the lessee for

conversion. The court held, "A bailee may refuse to surrender an item of personal
property in order to investigate the bailor's rights to return of the property if the bailee
distinctly communicates the reason for the qualified refusal to the bailor." Id. at 614.
Here, when Mr. Lawrence realized Intermountain claimed the right to possess the vehicle,
lie refused to surrender it but turned it over to cSave.net so it could resolve the dispute.
Mr. Lawrence testified at trial that he inquired of the parties at the repossession whether
there was a court order [writ of replevin]. Upon learning there was no writ of replevin, he
asserted his present right to the vehicle and communicated his wish to have the courts
decide who had the ultimate right to it. The police allowed him to keep the vehicle. Trial
Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 242 - 244. His refusal to surrender the vehicle to Intermountain
on January 31, 2001 and his choice to return it to cSave.net does not make him a
converter.
Intermountain argues Mr. Lawrence knew Wayne Wong was the lessee. Mr.
Lawrence only knew Wayne Wong was the personal guarantor of three leases entered
into on behalf of cSave.net. See Trans., Vol. I, p. 193, lines 20 & 21; Trans., Vol. I, p.
194, line 20 through p., 195, line5 ; Trans, Vol. I, p. 199, lines 9 -17; & Trans, Vol. II,
p. 220, lines 1-6.

Intermountain further argues Mr. Lawrence knew "Schwenke

intended not to surrender the vehicle to Intermountain or to Bank of America." See
Appellee Brief, p. 50. The trial court made no such finding and Intermountain offers no
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authority for ascertaining Mr. Lawrence's purported knowledge of the future actions of
Mr. Schwenke. On January 31, 2001, Mr. Lawrence ascertained only a contractual
dispute between cSave.net and Intermountain, not the grand fraudulent scheme
Intermountain presented to the trial court.
POINT 5. THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD
BE REVERSED BECAUSE ITS UNDERLYING FINDINGS WERE IN ERROR
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l) states,
[PJunitive damages may be awarded only if ... it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of
others.
The trial court based its finding of punitive damages against the Lawrences on its finding
they "conspired to defraud Intermountain" and their conduct "constitute^] knowing and
reckless indifference toward Intermountain.95

See Initial Findings, If 67. As argued

herein, the trial court's finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud was in
error; Wayne Wong's failure to disclose $10,000 in consideration was not unlawful and
cannot be imputed to the Lawrences. Further, no other unlawful acts were found and the
Lawrences did not commit conversion. For these reasons, the imposition of punitive
damages was also in error.
The trial court also imposed punitive damages on Mr. Lawrence because he turned
the Black Rodeo over to cSave.net upon learning of Intermountain9s attempted
repossession. See Initial Findings, ^f 66. It was not wrongful to do so and therefore Mr.
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Lawrence's decision does not meet the clear and convincing threshold of proving willful,
malicious or intentionally fraudulent behavior which would give rise to punitive damages.
See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991)(willful and
malicious conduct is "conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others"). Rather, Mr. Lawrence's decision was
reasonable in light of all circumstances. He did not know at that time who had the right
to possess the vehicle, but understood cSave.net to be the lessee. He was not presented
with a writ of replevin or other court order establishing Intermountain's legal right to the
vehicle.

The police officer on the scene who inspected the re-assignment to

Intermountain resolved the immediate situation by indicating Mr. Lawrence should leave
with the vehicle. See Initial Findings, <[ 28. Mr. Lawrence's decision, at worst, was an
honest error.

However, there is nothing to suggest he did anything improper by

relinquishing the vehicle to the entity who provided it to him.
POINT 6. ALTERNATIVELY, THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
CALCULATED USING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THE DENOMINATOR
AND THE LAWRENCES9 CONDUCT WAS NOT REPREHENSIBLE
A. Prejudgment Interest
Intermountain argues the inclusion of prejudgment interest in the denominator
when calculating punitive damages is appropriate. See Appellee Brief, p. 59. In support
of its argument, Intermountain relies on Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah
App. 1987)("Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages ...")
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However, Vasels did not address punitive damages at all, let alone conclude prejudgment
interest should be included when calculating punitive damages.
It does not make sense to include prejudgment interest in the baseline calculation
when computing punitive damages. For example, two parties suffering the same injury
on the same date by the same act of a defendant will obtain variant punitive damage
awards if one plaintiffs case goes to trial at a later date than the other. Sucfr cannot be the
result intended by the statute allowing for punitive damag.es. It could create a perverse
incentive for plaintiffs*to drag their cases out in order to increase the dollar amount of
pre-judgment interest and thereby increase the amount of punitive damages. Again, if the
court were to include prejudgment interest in calculating punitive damages, the punitive
damage amount would increase the longer it took to try the case, not because the harm to
the plaintiff was greater, but because it took longer to reach a verdict regarding the
amount of compensatory damages. Essentially, pre-judgment interest is meant to fully
restore the plaintiff with respect to compensatory damages, but not to augment punitive
damages.
Although sometimes prejudgment interest has been included in calculating
punitive damages, see Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), other
cases have separated it from the calculation. See Kealamalda, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 213
P.3d 13 (Utah Ct App. 2009). It appears the Court has never directly addressed the issue.
Here, if the punitive damage award against the Lawrences is to remain, it should be
21

recalculated to exclude pre-judgment interest from the baseline calculation.
B. The Lawrences' conduct was not reprehensible.
"The most important indicium of punitive the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).

The case is, at its heart, about

Intermountain's failure to get paid on three leases and eventual loss of three vehicles,
only one of which was ever possessed by the Lawrences. The fair rental value of the
Black Rodeo of the period of time the Lawrences possessed it was $3,625.40. For this,
Victor Lawrence was adjudged liable to Intermountain for over $600,000 and Cindy
Lawrence was adjudged liable for over $200,000.
The Supreme Court has instructed courts:
"to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm
caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced
indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of
the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or
was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Of the five factors listed above, only one has potential application to the present matter.
The harm caused to Intermountain was economic, not physical. The conduct did not
involve indifference to health or safety. Intermountain was not financially vulnerable.
The conduct was not repeated.9

The only applicable factor to determine the

9

Although the trial court stated, "the evidence at trial strongly suggested that Lawrence and
Schwenke had orchestrated a similar fraud before," it entered no finding of such previous
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reprehensibility of the Lawrences' conduct is whether such conduct involved trickery or
deceit. The trial court found the Lawrences benefited from a misrepresentation made by
Wayne Wong. However, as argued herein, there was no unlawful conduct to support any
finding of conspiracy to defraud nor was the Lawrences' possession of the Black Rodeo
wrongful. Such conduct is certainly not reprehensible.

conduct and there is no evidence of such conduct,
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's judgment should be reversed.
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